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CASE COMMENT

EDWARD T. YOUNG STILL LIVING THE GOOD
LIFE: COEUR D'ALENE TRIBE v. IDAHO

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Eleventh Amendment, which bars some private party suits
from being brought against states in federal court, has been one of
the more enigmatic provisions of the United States Constitution.'
The United States Supreme Court added to the amendment's jurisprudential legacy during its two most recently completed terms, handing down a pair of significant decisions concerning the ability of
private parties to sue state officials in federal court. Garnering attention in the 1996 term was the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe v. lorida,2 in which the Court expounded upon a limitation on the
application of the Exparte Young 3 doctrine, which, by its well-accepted
fiction, removes -the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional barrier to
suits in which a plaintiff seeks prospective relief from a state official
attempting to act in contravention of federal statutory or constitutional law.4 In Seminole Tribe, the Court explained that Young suits cannot overcome this jurisdictional barrier if Congress has enacted a
detailed remedial scheme that implicitly or explicitly evidences its intent to displace the availability of a Young claim. 5 Seminole Tribe was
decided amid a long line of other notable pro-federalism decisions
1 See, e.g., Eng v. Coughlin, 858 F.2d 889, 897 (2d Cir. 1988) ("Eleventh Amendmentjurisprudence has not been a model of logical symmetry, but marked rather by a
baffling complexity.");John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 CoLuM. L. REv. 1889, 1891 (1983) ("The eleventh
amendment today represents little more than a hodgepodge of confusing and intellectually indefensible judge-made law.").
2 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
3 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
4 See id at 159-60.
5 See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1132-33.
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that manifest the philosophy of the Court's majority to devolve signifi6
cant power from the federal to the state level.
During its last term, the Court appeared poised to use Idaho v.
Coeur d'Alene Tribe7 as another step in its march toward rebalancing
federal-state power in favor of the latter by sweeping a larger set of
state-officer suits, namely those involving private party claims to real
property in which a state also claims title, outside the scope of Young.
But as in Seminole Tribe, the Court in Coeur dcAlene tempered its profederalist zeal by chipping away only at the fringes of the Young doctrine. In Coeur d'Alene, a badly fractured Court further qualified the
application of the doctrine by prohibiting the Coeur d'Alene Tribe
from pursuing its federal court action against individual Idaho state
officials for possession of, and an end to, Idaho's regulatory authority
over the beds, banks, and submerged lands surrounding Lake Coeur
d'Alene.8 Albeit, Justice Kennedy, in the principal opinion, advocated
a fundamental shift in the doctrinal philosophy underpinning Young,
as well as a reworking of its relatively formalistic application into a
case-by-case balancing test. The majority of the Court, however, represented by Justice O'Connor's concurrence and Justice Souter's dissent, reaffirmed Young's importance as a counterbalance to the
Eleventh Amendment by affording private parties access to federal
6 See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997) (finding unconstitutional the portion of the Brady Act that commanded local sheriffs to conduct background checks on prospective handgun purchasers); Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct.
2072 (1997) (upholding Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act, which provided for
the civil commitment of persons who are likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual
violence); Missouri v.Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (limiting a federal court's discretion
to fashion remedies in desegregation cases even where there has been a finding of de
jure discrimination); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (striking down the
federal Gun-Free Zones Act, which prohibited the possession of firearms within 1000
feet of school grounds, stating that matters such as public education, crime, and domestic relations are generally within the ambit of the sovereign states); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (blocking federal legislation to force states to accept nuclear waste dumps within their borders, because the states are not mere political subdivisions of the United States and hence cannot be commandeered to carry
out federal purposes). The holdings in these cases are consistent with the declared
goal of the conservative majority presently on the Court "to reduce the role of the
federal government in everyday life by reducing the authority of Congress to put it
there." Hon. Sven Erik Holmes, Introduction: The October 1995 Supreme Court Term, 32
TULSA LJ. 355 (1997); see also Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, The Eleventh Amendment, and the PotentialEviscerationofEx parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495, 499 (1997)
(noting the "broader canvass of federalism on which the Court has been working
since 1990").
7 117 S.Ct. 2028 (1997).
8 See id. at 2032.
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courts in order to hold state officials, and thereby the states, accountable for violations of federal statutory and constitutional law. As the
controlling opinion in the case, Justice O'Connor's concurrence does
raise some troubling questions about the status- of the Court's Young
jurisprudence. Read broadly, her opinion appears to advocate a slight
variation of the principal opinion's balancing test: prohibiting extension of a federal forum whenever the underlying subject matter of the
Young suit implicates a historical aspect of state sovereignty. While
this reading is plausible, a careful analysis ofJustice O'Connor's opinion reveals that it stakes out a similar ideological position to that of
Justice Souter's, the two opinions parting substantially only over
whether the relief sought by the Coeur d'Alene Tribe rose to the level
of a quiet title action and was thereby barred entry into a federal forum by the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, while Coeur d'Alene carves
out another narrow exception to the Young doctrine, the case in no
way signals a turning point in the Court's Youngjurisprudence and
leaves essentially unchanged the ability of a private plaintiff to seek
prospective relief from a state official acting in contravention of federal statutory or constitutional law.
Part II of this Comment outlines the genesis of the Eleventh
Amendment and the evolution of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. Part HI traces the development and subsequent application of
the Ex parte Young doctrine. Part IV introduces the facts and the procedural history of the dispute in Coeur dAlene, and then discusses individually the three opinions in the case. Part V analyzes Justice
O'Connor's controlling opinion, arguing that although its muddled
and inconsistent reasoning could be interpreted as portending a dramatic retrenchment in the number of state-officer suits that fall within
the ambit of Young, her concurrence has shifted only slightly the line
demarcating permissible and impermissible extensions of Young
jurisdiction.
1I. TiH

ELEvENTH AMENDMENT

In order to understand the Ex parte Young exception to the Eleventh Amendment, as well as the arguments advanced in the three separate opinions in Coeur d'Alene, a brief overview of the history of the
Eleventh Amendment and the concept of state sovereignty is required. 9 The American conception of sovereign immunity-that one
9 This overview is by no means meant to be an exhaustive treatment of state
sovereignty and of the often muddled history of the Eleventh Amendment. For more
in depth discourse on these areas, see CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
AND SOVEiEIGN IMMUNITY (1972); William A. Fletcher, A HistoricalInterpretationof the
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sovereign, absent its consent, cannot be sued in the courts of another-traces its heritage to the English maxim "the king can do no
wrong." 10 This maxim embodied two concepts: (1) that the king was
not personally answerable to his subjects, as that would threaten his
sovereign authority; and (2) that the crown could do no injury as it
existed for the benefit of its subjects." The Founding Fathers, impressed with notions of English legal traditions, were, during their
construction of the framework of the Union, mindful of the need to
strike a delicate balance between state and federal power.' 2 The
Founders, however, never inserted a provision explicitly conferring a
right of sovereign immunity upon the states; instead, their answer was
the less encompassing Article III, Section 2 of the United States
Constitution.
By its terms, Article III, Section 2 confers upon federal courts jurisdiction over, among other things, controversies "between a State
and Citizens of another State."' 3 This state-citizen diversity clause in
Article III, Section 2 engendered little debate at the ratification convention, and the debate that did take place confirms that there was
little consensus on the meaning of this provision. 14 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Marshall believed that pursuant to the
Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant ofJurisdictionRather
than a ProhibitionAgainst Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033 (1983); Gibbons, supra
note 1; Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77
HARv. L. REV. 1 (1963);John E. Nowak, The Scope of CongressionalPower to Create Causes
of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1975).
10 The doctrine is also premised on the eighteenth century expression that "it is
better that an individual should sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an
inconvenience." Russell v. Men of Devon, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 362 (K.B. 1788).
11 See Wambdi Awanwicake Wastewin, Comment, Federal Courts-Indians:The Eleventh Amendment and Seminole Tribe: Reinvigoratingthe Doctrine of State Sovereign Immunity, 73 N.D. L. REV. 517, 522 & n.41 (1997) (citing 3 WILLIAM BLAcKsTONE,
COMMENTARIES * 255).
12 See id. By the eighteenth century, the King's immunity was less than absolute as
petitions of right, the writ by which a suit could be brought directly against the King,
were routinely granted. See Gibbons, supra note 1, at 1896.
13 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 more fully provides that "[t] he judicial Power shall
extend.., to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; to Controversies between two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States; between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands
under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects."
14 See Donald L. Boren, Suing a State in Federal Court Under a PrivateCause of Action:
An Eleventh Amendment Primer,37 CLuv.ST. L. REV. 417, 422 (1989); Martha A. Field,
The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L.
REv. 515, 527-36 (1978); Fletcher, supra note 9, at 1053-54.
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clause, a state could not be haled into a federal forum absent its consent. 15 However, Patrick Henry, George Guthrie, and two of the most
distinguished lawyers at the Constitutional Convention, James Wilson
and Edmund Randolph, took the opposite view, understanding that
the clause did confer federal jurisdiction over the states.' 6 Despite
this confusion, the Constitution was adopted with the understanding
that additional amendments would be added. 17 However, none of the
first twelve amendments proposed by the First Congress concerned
the amenability of the states to suit in federal court.'
Shortly after the Constitution's ratification in 1788, the United
States Supreme Court had an opportunity to test the Constitution's
purported jurisdictional grant. In the 1793 case of Chisholm v. Georgia,19 the Court allowed a citizen of South Carolina to pursue an action in federal court for the recovery of revolutionary war debts owed
by the State of Georgia. 20 Georgia refused to appear, instead entering
a written objection to the Court's assertion of jurisdiction over it.21
The Court found against Georgia, concluding that an implicit waiver
of the states' sovereign immunity had flowed from the Constitution's
grant ofjurisdiction; therefore, in a state-citizen diversity suit, a private
party could recover money damages from a state without that state's
express waiver of immunity.22 Chisholm, in part, reflected the need to

provide out-of-state creditors with a neutral forum in which to pursue
their claims against those states that had incurred heavy debts during
the war.23 More importantly, however, was the Court's fundamental
belief "that since the state was the creation of man, it should be no

15

See William D. Guthrie, The Eleventh Article of Amendment to the Constitution of the

United States, 8 COLUM. L. Rxv. 183, 184 (1908).
16 See id
17 See id.
18 See id.
19 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
20 Id.at 420. Robert Farquar, a South Carolina citizen, had supplied war material
to Georgia during the Revolution. Although Georgia had appropriated the necessary
funds, the Georgia commissaries failed to pay for the purchases. With the debt unpaid at Farquar's death, the executor of his estate and also a South Carolina citizen,
Alexander Chisholm, attempted to collect the money owed in an action in assumpsit.
SeeJOHN V. ORTH, THEJUDICLAL Powxa OF THE UNITED STATES 12 (1987).
21 See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 419.
22 See idL
at 476-79.
23 See Peter N. Swan, The Eleventh Amendment Revisited: Suits Against State Government Entities and Their Employees in Federal Courts, 14J.G. & U.L. 1, 3 (1987).
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more entitled to assert the defense of sovereign immunity than a
man."

24

Negative reaction to Chisholm was immediate.2 5 Fueling this reaction was the political climate at that time, which included talk of the
possibility of war with Great Britain.26 With Chisholm essentially holding that state sovereignty did not exist under the constitutional framework, the erection of some jurisdictional barrier was believed to be
necessary in order to prevent Tories and British creditors from initiating collection actions against the states in federal courts. 27 Consequently, on February 19, 1793, the day after Chisholm was reported, a
resolution for a Constitutional Amendment that would overturn the
24 Fletcher, supra note 9, at 1056. In one of the majority opinions, ChiefJustice
Jay wrote that the feudal notion of complete sovereignty is inconsistent with democracy. Consequently, private party suits against states were not inconsistent with the
states' limited sovereignty. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 471-73. Jay continued that
the unequal treatment by individual states of citizens of other states and countries was
"among the evils against which it was proper for the nation, that is, the people of all
the United States, to provide by a national judiciary." Id. at 474. Justice Wilson, in
another of the majority opinions, wrote:
A State like a merchant, makes a contract. A dishonest State, like a dishonest merchant, willfully refuses to discharge it: The latter is amenable to a
Court of Justice: Upon general principles of right, shall the former when
summoned to answer the fair demands of its creditor, be permitted, proteuslike, to assume a new appearance, and to insult him and justice, by declaring
I am a SOVEREIGN State?
Id. at 456.
25 The Court's decision in Chisholm, as well as the subsequent commencement of
Vassal v. Massachusetts, an unreported federal court action for the return of loyalist
property allegedly confiscated in violation of the 1783 peace treaty that formally
ended the revolutionary war, see RodolpheJ.A. de Seife, The King Is Dead, Long Live the
King! The Court-CreatedAmerican Concept of Immunity: The Negation of Equality and Accountability Under Law, 24 HOFSTRA L. Rv. 981, 1012-13 & n.143 (1996); Calvin R.
Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 61,
114 n.279 (1989), caused great alarm among the states, especially those burdened by
war debts. See Guthrie, supranote 15, at 184. So upset was the State of Georgia that its
legislature was purported to have enacted a law "subjecting to death without benefit
of clergy any officer who should attempt to serve a process in any suit against the
State." Id. at 185. No such law has been found to exist, but if any such law did, it was
most probably passed only by Georgia's lower house. See id.; see also Fletcher, supra
note 9, at 1058 ("Other states were alarmed by [Chisholm], not only because of the
symbolic affront to their sovereignty, but also because of their considerable indebtedness in the postwar period.").
26 See Boren, supra note 14, at 429.
27 See id.; see also Gibbons, supranote 1, at 1894, 1926-34 (attributing the development of the Eleventh Amendment more to foreign policy concerns than to a strong
notion of state sovereign immunity).
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case was introduced in the House of Representatives. 28 A second resolution was introduced the following day, but both resolutions were
tabled and Congress adjourned without acting on them.2 9 The following session, the resolution that is now the Eleventh Amendment was
introduced in the Senate and was passed quickly by both houses of
Congress. 30
On its face, the Eleventh Amendment is not troubling. The
amendment provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."31 A
literal interpretation of the amendment, therefore, indicates that it
prohibits only those actions initiated in a federal forum against a state
by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.3 2 The Supreme Court,
however, has found much deeper complexities hidden by this apparentiy straightforward language.

28 That first resolution, introduced by representative Theodore Sedgewick,
stated:
[N]o state shall be liable to one made a party defendant, in any of the judicial courts, established, or which shall be established under the authority of
the United States, at the suit of any person or persons whether a citizen or
citizens, or a foreigner or foreigners, of any body politic or corporate,
whether within or without the United States.
Nowak, supra note 9, at 1436 (quoting 3 ANNALS OF CONG. 651-52 (1793)).
29 The second resolution read as follows: "TheJudicial power of the United States
shall not extend to any suits in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state." Id.(quoting 4 A'nNLs OF CONG. 25 (1794)).
30 SeeJohn V. Orth, The Truth About JusticeIredell's Dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia
(1793), 73 N.G. L. REV. 255, 256 (1994). The resolution was introduced onJanuary 2,
1794, and was passed by the Senate on January 14, 1794, and by the House on March
4, 1794. See Nowak, supranote 9, at 1436. On January 8, 1798, PresidentJohn Adams
declared the Amendment in force after it had been ratified by three-quarters of the
states. See Swan, supra note 23, at 3. Some scholarship, however, supports the proposition that the requisite twelve states had ratified the amendment by February of 1795.
SeeJAcoBs, supra note 9, at 67.
31 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
32 According to this reading of the amendment, also called the "diversity view,"
the amendment simply precludes party-based jurisdiction under Article III, but does
not preclude jurisdiction when based on subject matter. Others, as does the Supreme
Court, read the amendment much more broadly, interpreting it to foreclose all Article III jurisdiction over private 1iarty suits against the states. See DanielJ. Meltzer, The
Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 10-13; Henry
Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception,'110HARv.L. REV. 102, 104 (1996).
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The Supreme Court's first major expansion of the Eleventh
Amendment's jurisdictional bar occurred in Hans v. Louisiana.3 3
Hans, a Louisiana citizen, brought suit in federal court against the
State of Louisiana in order to recover interest due on a bond issue
that the State had attempted to repudiate. 34 Hans argued that the
Eleventh Amendment presented no barrier to the conferral of federal
jurisdiction over his claim because the amendment restricts jurisdiction in diversity alone, whereas he was a citizen of the state against
which he had filed suit and implicit in the amendment was a ratification of a citizen's right to sue his home state.3 5 While the Court was
careful to agree that a literal reading of the amendment did not prohibit Hans's suit,3

6

the Court stated that Hans's interpretation of the

amendment "strain[ed] the Constitution and the law to a construction never imagined or dreamed of."3 7 The foundation of the Court's

reasoning was that Hans's suggested interpretation of the amendment
would create the anomalous situation in which a state could be sued
by its own citizens in federal-question cases, but would be immune
from suits by citizens of a sister state on the same cause of action.3 8
Although the Hans Court's rationale prominently rested on this
impermissible jurisdictional anomaly, the Court has subsequently read
Hans broadly, interpreting it to represent the proposition that the
Eleventh Amendment stands "not so much for what it says, but for the
presupposition of our constitutional structure which it confirms: that
the States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact
[and] that the judicial authority in Article III is limited by this sovereignty ... ."39 The principle thus carried forward from Hans was the
33 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
34 See id. at 1-3.
35 See id. at 10.
36 See id.
37 Id. at 15.
38 See id. The majority believed that the Founding Fathers had never intended to
give Article III courts jurisdiction over suits against a state by whomever brought
them, id. at 14-15, and that Chisholm had sent "a shock of surprise throughout the
country" that the Eleventh Amendment had been promptly adopted to correct the
decision, see id. at 11.
39 Blatchford v. Native Village, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991), accord Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984) (stating that the Eleventh Amendment's "greater significance lies in its affirmation that the fundamental principle of
sovereign immunity limits the grant ofjudicial authority in Art. III"). The Hans Court
did assert that the Chisholm majority had erred in its interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment, and that "[this amendment, expressing the will of the ultimate sovereignty of the whole country, superior to all legislatures and all courts, actually reversed the decision of the Supreme Court [in Chisholm]." Hans, 134 U.S. at 11.
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Court's having effectively read both the Eleventh Amendment and the
Constitution to impart a broad, non-textual right of sovereign immu40
nity upon the states.
III.

EX PAR7E YOUNG

An immediate and likely inadvertent quandary presented itself to
the Court after its decision in Hans. Read broadly, Hans appeared to
forbid all suits against an unconsenting state in federal court. Such a
jurisdictional limitation would mean that under our judicial system,
which is based on the supremacy of federal law, the lower federal
courts were powerless to compel the states' compliance with that
law.4 ' Therefore, in Ex parte Young, the Court crystallized the fiction
that a suit to enjoin a state official from violating federal constitutional law does not implicate the sovereignty of a state as does a suit
directly against the state itself, thus vitiating any conflict with the Elev42
enth Amendment.
40 See Hans, 134 U.S. at 13-16; see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114,
1131-32 (1996) (reaffirming that the fundamental principle of state sovereign immunity is a limit on Article III jurisdiction).
The Court has used this "Hansian philosophy" to guide its subsequent reinforcements of the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar. In Principality of Monaco v.
Mcsissipp4 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934), the Court held that the states' sovereign immunity precluded a foreign sovereign from suing an unconsenting state in federal court.
Monaco had asserted that Article III, Section 2 conferred federal jurisdiction over its
suit to recover on bonds issued by Mississippi. See id. at 320. The Court concluded
that the Eleventh Amendment barred the suit despite the fact that Article III, Section
2, which provides that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend... between a State ... and
foreign States," appears to permit such a suit. Additionally, the Court has held that
because the amendment "sufficiently partakes of the nature of ajurisdictional bar," a
state may raise the Eleventh Amendment as a defense at any time during litigation.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974). The amendment, however, has not
been held to extend to suits brought by a state against another state, see Kansas v.
Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907), although a state may not sue another state in federal
court on behalf of a group of its citizens who hold bonds of the defendant state, see
New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 89-91 (1883). The Eleventh Amendment
has also been held not to prohibit suits initiated by the United States against a state.
See United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 646 (1892).
41 See William Burnham, "BeamMe Up, There's No IntelligentLife Here:A Dialogueon
the Eleventh Amendment with Lawyers From Mars, 75 NEB. L. REv. 551, 558 (1996).
42 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908). Ex parte Young is credited ith
establishing this fiction, but Young merely reconciled already established Supreme
Court precedents holding that a state official who attempts to enforce a state law that
is allegedly inconsistent with federal constitutional law could be sued in federal court
without the state's consent. See, e.g., Gunter v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 200 U.S. 273
(1906) (enjoining a state attorney general from collecting an unconstitutional tax
levy); Prout v. Starr, 188 U.S. 537 (1903) (finding that a federal court could enjoin a
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In Ex parte Young, a group of shareholders from nine different
railroads sued Minnesota's Attorney General, Edward T. Young, in
federal court, seeking to enjoin his continued enforcement of two al43
legedly unconstitutional Minnesota acts regulating railway rates.
The Attorney General argued that the shareholders' suit was essentially a suit against the State of Minnesota and thus violated the Eleventh Amendment because neither he nor the state had consented to
the action. 44 The Court rejected this argument, holding that state officials who attempt to enforce unconstitutional laws may be enjoined
from doing so by federal courts. 45 In justifying its holding, the Court
explained that if the act sought to be enjoined is alleged by the plaintiff to be, and is in fact, unconstitutional, a state official's "use of the
state attorney general from enforcing an unconstitutional state railroad rate regulation statute); Smyth v.Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898) (denying Eleventh Amendment
immunity to state officials who sought to be enjoined from enforcing an unconstitutional railroad rate regulation statute); Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204 (1897) (denying Eleventh Amendment immunity to South Carolina state officials who had
deprived plaintiffs of due process and just compensation in seizing their property);
Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1891) (denying immunity to state officials
who attempted to sell real property pursuant to unconstitutional state legislation);
Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531 (1875) (holding that a federal court
could enjoin state officials from issuing additional state bonds that would impair the
security of the plaintiffs bonds); Davis v. Gray, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 203 (1872) (denying
state officials immunity from a suit to enjoin their attempted seizure of the plaintiff's
real property). Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), is
considered to be the American genesis of the Ex parte Young fiction. Osborn, like its
immediate progeny, however, relied on the "party of record rule" in order to enjoin
state officials from collecting an unconstitutional tax because the named defendants
were the state officials and not the state itself. Id.at 856-59.
The Young fiction traces its lineage to a similar fiction used by England's common law courts. In England, the King was generally immune from suit. Common law
courts, however, would distinguish between the King and his agents on the theory
that the King could not authorize unlawful conduct, and thus the unlawful acts of his
officers could not be imputed as the acts of the sovereign. The fiction served two
purposes: First, it allowed the common law courts to avoid confronting directly the
issue of the King's sovereign immunity. Second, it allowed the courts to curb the
abuses of the monarch. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,
142-43 & n.21 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
43 See Young, 209 U.S. at 129-31. The Minnesota Legislature had passed an act
reducing railroad passenger rates from three cents per mile to two cents per mile and
a second act establishing a fixed rate schedule for the transportation of certain commodities. The shareholders claimed that the acts violated their rights to equal protection and to due process. See id. at 127-28. Quite ironically, in the Court's final
disposition of the Young matter, the Court adjudged the rates to be constitutional. See
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352 (1913).
44 See Young, 209 U.S. at 132.
45 See id.at 156.
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name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act... is a proceeding without the authority of and one which does not affect the State in
its sovereign or governmental capacity." 46 In such a case, the official is
"stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in
his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State
has no power to impart to him any immunity. '4 7 In other words, the
Ex parte Young doctrine rests on the fiction that because a state cannot
authorize a violation of federal statutory or constitutional law, an officer enforcing such a violative state law is not exercising state authority.48 The practical effect of enjoining or requiring action on behalf
of a state official is, nonetheless, felt directly by the state.
The Court has taken several subsequent opportunities to clarify
the situations in which Youngjurisdiction may exist. 49 In Edelman v.

Jordan,5° the Court held that although ordering the payment of future
public aid benefits from a state's treasury was permissible prospective
relief, compelling the payment of retroactive monetary awards from a
state's treasury more closely resembled an award against the state itself
51
rather than the prospective injunctive relief awarded in Young.
Therefore, awards of retrospective monetary relief are barred from
Young suits. 52 In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,53 the
46 Id at 159.
47 Id at 160.
48 This fiction creates the irony that for the purposes of Exparte Young an unconstitutional action is not attributable to the state, while for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment, such illegal conduct is considered to be state action. See Florida Dep't
of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 685 (1982) (noting the irony of the
fiction, but reaffirming the Exparte Youngdoctrine as one of the bedrock principles of
Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence).
49 The Court's first attempt to limit the application of Ex parte Young occurred
several months after Young was decided. In Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S.
210 (1908), the Court held that federal courts should not enjoin state officers until
the prospective plaintiff had exhausted all his or her available administrative appeals
before seeking a federal remedy. The Court, however, was careful to note that its
holding was merely an exercise of discretion, not a reflection on any deficiency in
federal court jurisdiction. See id. at 229-32.
50 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Both the district court and the Seventh Circuit had ordered officers of Illinois' public aid department "to release and remit" benefits wrongfully withheld from the plaintiffs. Id. at 655-56.
51 See id. at 665 ("[W]hen the action is in essence one for the recovery of money
from the state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled to
invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual officials are nominal
defendants."); id. at 663 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S.

459, 464 (1945)).
52 See id at 665, 668. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist explained that
awarding retroactive benefits would be much more disruptive of the state's budgetary
process than would ordering compliance that required the release of future pay-
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Court further expounded upon the application of the doctrine, holding that federal courts could not enjoin a state official whose actions
violated only state law.54 One of the principal justifications the Young

Court used to advance its fiction was the necessity of having federal
courts ensure the supremacy of federal law.5 5 That necessity, the
Court explained, disappears when a federal court attempts to grant
relief against state officials on the basis of state law because such relief
has no impact on the vindication of the supreme authority of federal
law.

56

More recently, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,5 7 the Court for the first
time refused to extend Youngjurisdiction to a plaintiff seeking prospective relief for a state official's alleged violation of federal statutory
law. Pursuant to the requirements of the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act (IGRA) 58 the Seminole Tribe had been negotiating a tribal-state
ments. Id. at 664-67. In a Young suit three years later, the Court in Milliken v. Bradley,
433 U.S. 267, 290 (1977), ordered Michigan to pay a retroactive monetary award for
compensatory educational programs to children who had been forced to attend inferior segregated schools, believing that such compensatory relief did not violate the
Eleventh Amendment. An attempt to reconcile Edelman and Milliken is beyond the
scope of this Comment. Sufficient for this discussion is that retrospective monetary
awards are generally prohibited in Young suits.
53 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
54 See id. at 106.
55 See id. at 105 ("[T] he Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit
the federal courts to vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to the
supreme authority of the United States.... Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the Young doctrine rests on the need to promote the vindication of federal
rights.") (citations omitted); see also Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) ("Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate
the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law.").
56 See id. at 106 ("[I]t is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their
conduct to state law. Such a result conflicts directly with the principles of federalism
that underlie the Eleventh Amendment.").
Pennhurst,however, leads to three unpalatable forum options for a plaintiff with
both state and federal law claims. The plaintiff could forego the federal forum, bringing all her claims in state court. She could split the case, filing in both state and
federal court, but she then runs the risk of res judicata if the state forum adjudicates
the matter first. And third, the plaintiff may file first in federal court, and, if unsuccessful, later seek redress in state court. This last alternative, however, is costly in
terms of time and money, and may eventually generate statute of limitations concerns. See Courtney E. Flora, Chapter, An Inapt Fiction: The Use of the Ex parte Young
Doctrinefor Environmental Citizen Suits Against States After Seminole Tribe, 27 ENVrL. L.
935, 948 n.95 (1997).
57 116 S.Ct. 1114 (1996).
58 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994). The IGRA was enacted in order to restore to
the states a role in regulating casino-type gaming on the reservations and to insulate
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gaming compact with the State of Florida, the agreement on a compact being a necessary precondition to a tribe's operation of gambling
casinos on its reservation. 59 After Florida's officials proved unwilling
to negotiate about forms of gambling prohibited by the State, the
Seminole Tribe brought suit in federal district court against the State
of Florida and its Governor, Lawton Chiles, contending that the
breakdown in negotiations violated the IGRA's good faith negotiation
60
provision.
Although the Seminole Tribe's action against the State was
barred by the Eleventh Amendment, 61 the Seminole Tribe attempted
to pursue its claim against Governor Chiles, asserting that it was entifled to proceed under Ex parte Young because it was seeking only prospective relief to compel Florida's officials to abide by the IGRA's
mandate to negotiate in good faith. 62
The Court conceded that suits, such as the Seminole Tribe's, to
compel state officials to conform their future actions to the dictates of
federal statutory law are generally allowed by Ex parte Young.63 The
Court, nevertheless, disallowed the Seminole Tribe's use of the doctrine, reasoning that "where Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily
created right, a court should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action against a state officer based upon Ex
parte Young."64 The Court explained that the cause of action authorIndian gaming from corrupt influences. See Meltzer, supra note 32, at 4; C. Shannon
Bacon, Note, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: What Congress Giveth, The Court Taketh
Away-Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 30 CREIGITON L. REV. 569 (1997).
59 See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct at 1119-20 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (1) (1994)).
60 See id. at 1121. By the IGRA's terms, "the State shall negotiate with the Indian
tribe in good faith to enter into such a [tribal-state] compact." 25 U.S.C.
§ 2710(d) (3) (A) (1994). For a state's failure to enter into negotiations or to negotiate in good faith, the IGRA conferred upon federal district courts jurisdiction over
any action initiated by a tribe arising from such a failure. 25 U.S.C.
§ 2710(d) (7) (A) (i) (1994).
61 See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct at 1126-32.
62 See id. at 1132.
63 See id.
64 Id. The Court rested its holding on Schweikerv. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988), in
which the plaintiff, who had been erroneously denied social security disability benefits
in violation of the Due Process Clause, sought the creation of a Bivens remedy in
order to compensate for the violation. Id. at 417-21. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents ofFederalBureau ofNarcotics,403 U.S. 388 (1971), the Court held that the victim
of a Fourth Amendment violation by federal officers, who had acted under color of
their authority, could sue for damages. The Schweiker Court explained that it had
traditionally been hesitant to create additional Bivens remedies when Congress, in its
design of a statutory program, has indicated that the remedies provided by that pro-
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ized by the IGRA was strictly limited in its remedial scope, 65 while an
action brought under Ex Parte Young would expose Governor Chiles
"to the full remedial powers of a federal court, including, presumably,
contempt sanctions. '66 By declining to extend Youngjurisdiction, the
Court believed that it had fully effectuated Congress' intent, as evidenced by its development of a limited remedial scheme for the
IGRA, to avoid exposing an IGRA defendant to the broad range of
67
federal remedial powers.
Young jurisdiction can, therefore, be abrogated when it is found
to conflict with congressional intent. However, the Court clarified
that its holding did not disallow Congress from authorizing Young ju68
risdiction over a cause of action with a limited remedial scheme.
Rather, the Court's holding was limited, given the narrow focus of the
remedial scheme imposed by the IGRA, which would have been rendered no more than surplusage with which no Indian tribe would
have bothered were "the more complete and more immediate relief'
69
via pursuit of a Young claim available.
After deciding Seminole Tribe, the Court granted Idaho's petition
for writ of certiorari, seemingly poised to continue against its backgram are adequate to cure any constitutional violations that may occur from the program's administration, regardless of whether the available remedies would provide
"complete relief" for the violation. Because Congress had created an adequate remedial scheme for those persons improperly denied social security disability benefits,
nothing compelled the creation of a Bivens remedy. Schweiker, 412 U.S. at 422-29.
The Court in Seminole Tribe recognized that although Schweiker concerned the creation of a new Bivens remedy, its rationale applied by analogy to the lifting of the
Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar. Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1132.
65 Under the IGRA's remedial scheme, if a court finds that a state has failed to
negotiate in good faith, "the court shall order the State and the Indian Tribe [sic] to
conclude such a compact within a 60-day period." 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (7) (B) (iii)
(1994) (footnote omitted). Failing the agreement on a compact within that 60-day
period, both the Tribe and the State shall submit "their last best offer for a compact"
to a court appointed mediator who shall select a compact from between the two submitted offers. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (7) (B) (iv) (1994).
66 Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1133. But seeJackson, supra note 6, at 514-17 (arguing that the Ex parte Young injunction did not necessarily provide a broader remedy
than did the IGRA's remedial scheme).
Justice Souter argued in his dissent that the Court has "never before inferred a
congressional intent to eliminate [Young's] time-honored practice of enforcing federal law," adding that although such an intent may be inferred, it should be inferred
only from a clear statement of federal intent to block the Young claim. Souter added
that "in practice, in the real world of congressional legislation, such an intent would
be exceedingly odd." Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1180 (Souter, J., dissenting).
67 See id. at 1133.
68 See id.at 1133 n.17.
69 Id. at 1133.
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drop of pro-federalist decisions by using its recent encroachment into
Ex parte Young as a springboard toward removing an even greater
number of potential cases from the ambit of that doctrine. However,
save for the great ideological transmutation in Youngjurisprudence
made by Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist from Seminole
Tribe to Coeur dAlene, the Court's majority has tempered its attempts
to reposition the states' authority in the Union when resolving questions about Ex parte Young. Granted that Coeur d'Alene, like Seminole
Tribe, carved out a narrow exception at the edges of Exparte Young, the
Court's majority declined to chart a new direction in Youngjurisprudence despite the opportunity to create a real property exception to
the doctrine.
IV.

A.

JADHO v. COEff

1) ALENfE TIBE OF
P.DAO

The United States District Court Decision

On October 15, 1991, the Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho filed suit
in Federal District Court for the District of Idaho, claiming the beneficial interest, subject to the trusteeship of the United States, in the
beds and banks of all navigable watercourses and waters within the
original boundaries of its reservation, 70 as defined by President
Ulysses S. Grant's Executive Order of November 8, 1873,71 and ratified by Congress in 1891.72 Coeur d'Alene tribal leaders had grown

dissatisfied with the State's failure to enforce health and pollution
laws affecting the lake, its failure to monitor mining and timber operations near the lake, and its hindrance of the lakeshore owners' access
"to a great national treasure."73
70 See Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 798 F. Supp. 1443, 1445 (D. Idaho 1992).
71 For a reprint of the Executive Order that Established the Coeur d'Alene Indian Reservation, see David W. Gross, Note, Examining Aboriginal Rights in Submerged
Lands: Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 30 IDAHO L. REv. 139, 149 n.2 (1993).
72 Exec. Order of November 8, 1873, ch. 543, § 26 Stat. 989, 1026-29 (1891).
73 Coeur d'Alene Tribe Is Laying Claim to Lake, SEATx.E TnIES, May 5, 1991, at B9,
availablein 1991 WL 4458110 (quoting tribal elder Henry SiJohn). Tribal chairman
Ernie Stensgar said that the Tribe filed the lawsuit to quiet title to the lake because of
its concern that mining and timber operations sanctioned by the State were contributing to a degradation of the lake. "Idaho's stewardship [of Lake Coeur d'Alene] has
been a clear failure," Stensgar said, adding that "[ijt is painful to sit back and watch
the waters of our lake being subject to such brutality through the pollution and privatization of all done in the name of profit." He concluded that "[s]ince the tribe has
never relinquished title to the lake, we feel obligated to do something to improve the
lake." Id. In 1991, the United States Geological Survey reported that after a century
of mining in the area, Lake Coeur d'Alene registered the highest heavy-metal contain-
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The Tribe named as defendants the State of Idaho, various state
agencies, and certain state officials in their individual capacities. In its
complaint, the Tribe sought from the court an order quieting title to
the disputed lands in the Tribe;74 "a declaratory judgment that the
bed, banks, and waters at issue are for the exclusive use, occupancy,
and enjoyment of the Tribe"; 75 a declaration that all Idaho statutes
and ordinances that regulate or affect in any way the disputed lands
and waters are invalid; 7 6 and, lastly, an injunction preventing the
State, its agencies, and its officials from taking any action to regulate
or to interfere with in any way the Tribe's exclusive right to the dis77
puted lands and waters.
Idaho responded to the Tribe's charges by filing a Rule 12(b) (6)
motion to dismiss, claiming that the Tribe's suit was "barred by the
jurisdictional limitations imposed on the federal judiciary by the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution." 78 In the alternative, the State grounded its motion on a failure by the Tribe to state a
79
claim upon which relief could be granted.
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Blatchford v. Native
Village,80 which held that suits initiated by Indian tribes against unconsenting states are prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment,8 ' the disination in the world. See Peggy Anderson, Tribe ChallengesRuling on Idaho Lake, PORTFeb. 3, 1994, at C02, availablein 1994 WL 4828299.

LAND OREGONIAN,

74 See Coeur d'Alene, 798 F. Supp. at 1445.
75 Id.
76 See id. In particular, the Tribe sought to declare invalid the water right set
forth in section 67-4304 of Idaho's statutory code. That section states in pertinent

part:
The governor is hereby authorized and directed to appropriate in trust for
the people of the state of Idaho all the unappropriated water of Priest, Pend
d'Oreille and Coeur d'Alene Lakes or so much thereof as may be necessary
to preserve said lakes in their present condition. The preservation of said

water in said lakes for scenic beauty, health, recreation, transportation and
commercial purposes necessary and desirable for all the inhabitants of the
state is hereby declared to be a beneficial use of such water.
§ 67-4304 (1995). Idaho's Legislature had also passed a number of other
regulations affecting Lake Coeur d'Alene. See IDAHO CODE § 39-3613 (Supp. 1997);
§ 58-104(9) (1994 & Supp. 1997); §§ 67-4304 to -4306 (1995 & Supp. 1997); and
IDAHO CODE

§§ 70-201 to -208 (1989 & Supp. 1997).
77

See Coeur d'Alene, 798 F. Supp. at 1445.

78 Id.
79 See id.
80 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
81 In reaching its holding in Blatchford, the Supreme Court rejected the Noatak
Tribe's argument that, as a sovereign tribe, it could sue a sovereign state without triggering the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar. See Coeur d'Alene, 798 F. Supp. at
1446-47 (citing Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 780-81). The Court also rejected the argument
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trict court granted the State's motion, dismissing the Tribe's claims
against the State and its agencies. 8 2 Next, the district court concluded
that the Tribe's action for declaratory judgment and to quiet tifle
against Idaho's individual state officials was also barred by the Eleventh Amendment because these claims "do not fall within the narrow
exception set forth in Ex parte Young and its progeny."8 3 The court
believed that the declaratory relief sought by the Tribe would be, in
essence, equivalent to an award of damages or of restitution by the
court, thereby executing an "end run" around Edelman's prohibition
of federal suits against state officials for money damages or its
84
equivalent.
As to the Tribe's prayer for injunctive relief, the court explained
that if Idaho were not the rightful owner of the disputed lands, the
court could enjoin the individual state officials from interfering with
the Tribe's ownership rights in the land.85 Without hearing argu-

ments, however, the court concluded that this relief was unavailable
because, pursuant to the Equal Footing Doctrine, 86 "Idaho is and always has been in rightfufl possession of the beds, banks, and waters of
all of the navigable watercourses at issue in this case."8 7 The court
explained that according to the Equal Footing Doctrine, it is well established that the federal government held land under navigable waters in trust, to be granted to new states as they entered the Union,
thereby assuring that these new members of the Union assumed sover88
eignty on an "equal footing" with the then already established states.
The doctrine, therefore, necessarily gives rise to a strong presumption
against pre-statehood conveyances of these lands.8 9 This presumption
that the states, by adopting the Constitution, had waived their immunity from suits by
Indian tribes, reasoning that "there is no compelling evidence that the Founders
thought such a surrender inherent in the constitutional compact." Id. (quoting

Blatchford, 501 U.S. at 781).
82 See Coeur d'Alene, 798 F. Supp. at 1446-48.
83 1& at 1449.
84 See id. at 1448.

85 See id. at 1449.
86 See id. The American version of the Equal Footing Doctrine had its genesis in
the English common law, under which the English Crown held in trust for the public's benefit all the lands underlying navigable waters because their importance to
navigation, domestic and foreign commerce, fishing, and other commercial activities
was considered to be essential to the sovereign. When the colonies gained their independence from Great Britain, they claimed, as the sovereign successors to the English
Crown, title to the lands under navigable waters within their boundaries. See id. at

1449 (citing Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195-96 (1987)).
87 Id. at 1452.
88 See id. at 1449 (citing Utah Div. of State Lands, 482 U.S. at 195-96).
89 See id. at 1449-50 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 552 (1981)).
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arises from the recognition that although Congress may at times have
conveyed lands under its navigable waters for certain purposes, the
fact that "control over the property underlying navigable waters is so
strongly identified with the sovereign power of government.., it will
not be held that the United States has conveyed such land except because of 'some international duty or public exigency."' 90 Such a
strong presumption can be overcome only by demonstrating that the
intention to convey was "'definitely declared or otherwise made
plain' ... or was rendered 'in clear and especial words' ... or 'unless

the claim confirmed in terms embraces the land under the waters of
the stream.' "91
The Tribe maintained that the 1873 Executive Order, which particularly described part of the boundary of its reservation as extending
to the middle of the Spokane River, evinced the requisite intent to
overcome the strong presumption against conveyance. 9 2 The district
court, however, likened this Executive Order to the 1868 treaty with
the United States upon which the Crow Indians, in Montana v. United
States,9 3 rested their claim to quiet title to and to end the State of
Montana's regulatory authority over hunting and fishing on its reservation. 9 4 In Montana, the Supreme Court determined that the treaty's
detailed description of the Crow's boundary as extending to the middle of a section of the Yellowstone River was a mere reservation of the
land in a "general way," which could not overcome the presumption
against pre-statehood conveyances. 95 The district court, relying on
this reasoning, concluded that the 1873 Executive Order, which used
similar descriptive language, likewise could not overcome the presumption against pre-statehood conveyances, thus meaning that
Idaho has been in lawful possession of the disputed lands since it entered the Union. 96
90
91
92
93

Id. (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 552).
Id. at 1450 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 552).
See id.at 1451.
450 U.S. 544 (1981).

94 See Coeur d'Alene, 798 F. Supp. at 1450-51 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 549,
554).
95 See id at 1451 (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 554).
at 1451-52. But see Buttz v. Northern Pac. R.R., 119 U.S. 55 (1886) (stat96 See id.
ing that an agreement with a tribe concerning the boundaries of its land is effective
when entered and that Congress' ratification serves merely as an acceptance of cession); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 11-22,
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S.Ct. 2028 (1997) (No. 94-1474) (arguing that the
United States intended to and did effect a pre-statehood conveyance of a portion of
the lands at issue); Gross, supra note 71, at 149 (arguing that the Equal Footing Doctrine's presumption against pre-statehood conveyances is inapplicable to this dispute
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Decision

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding
that the Eleventh Amendment barred all the Tribe's claims against
Idaho and its agencies. 97 As to the Tribe's quiet title action against
Idaho's individual officials, the Ninth Circuit relied on loida Department of State v. TreasureSalvors, Inc.,98 which the appellate court interpreted to hold that "federal courts may not hear actions to quiet title
to property in which the state claims an interest, without the state's
consent," and thus dismissed that portion of Tribe's claim.9 9
The appellate court, however, also interpreted TreasureSalvors to
allow federal suits for "declaratory and injunctive relief against state
officials... even if that relief works to put the plaintiff in possession of
property also claimed by the state."10 0 The court explained that the
fiction that cases adjudicating title to property claimed by a state in
violation of federal law do not involve that state does not hold; a state
so claiming title is a real party in interest in the litigation.1 0 ' And
although a suit brought directly against a state by a private party also
because President Grant's 1873 Executive Order did not purport to give the Tribe any
land, but merely recognized the Tribe's title to the land, and that the 1891 agreements limiting and defining the reservation were not ratified until eight months after
Idaho had achieved statehood on July 3, 1890).
97 See Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 42 F.3d 1244, 1250 (9th Cir. 1994).
98 458 U.S. 670 (1981). In TreasureSalvors, pursuant to a Florida statute covering
treasure troves and artifacts abandoned on state-owned property, state officials
claimed an interest in 25% of the artifacts recovered by Treasure Salvors, Inc., from a
Spanish galleon that sank purportedly within Florida's coastal waters. After an unrelated action adjudged the lands under the galleon to be federal lands, Treasure Salvors, Inc., filed an action to recover the portion of the treasure that it had turned over
to the state. See id at 673-76. The Court developed a three-part test to determine
whether a state official was immune from an action to adjudicate the disposition of
property in which both the plaintiff and a state claim an interest: (1) Is the action
asserted against state officials or against the state itself? (2) Does the challenged conduct of the state officials constitute an ultra vires or unconstitutional withholding of
property or merely a tortious interference with property rights? (3) Is the prayed for
relief prospective in nature or is it analogous to a retroactive award that requires the
payment of funds from the state treasury? Id.at 690. After quickly ascertaining that
the first two prongs of the test were met, the Ninth Circuit focused its analysis on
determining whether the Tribe's claim satisfied the third prong of the inquiry. See
Coeur d'Alene, 42 F.3d at 1250-51.
99 Coeur d'Alene, 42 F.3d at 1252.
100 Id101 See id. at 1254. Idaho's officials based their argument on several circuit court
of appeals cases holding that a federal court does not have the power to adjudicate a
state's interest in property without the state's consent. See id at 1252-53 (citing
cases). The Ninth Circuit dismissed these cases as indistinguishable from and thus
irreconcilable in the face of Treasure Salvors. See id. at 1253.
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claiming an interest in that same land is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, the same suit brought as a Young claim against officials
of that state, who must act in compliance with federal law and who can
be compelled to do so by a federal court, may proceed in a federal
forum so long as the relief allowed would not foreclose the state's
02
claim to the disputed property in future judicial proceedings.
Thus, on remand, if the district court were to find that the disputed
property rightfully belonged to the Tribe pursuant to federal law, the
district court may pronounce the Tribe to be the owner of the property against all claimants except Idaho and its agencies. 10 3 The Ninth
Circuit anticipated that its solution would not satisfy either of the parties involved-the plaintiffs in TreasureSalvors had complained of such
a problem-but the court refused to deny a federal forum to enforce
the Tribe's federal rights merely because that forum could not pro04
vide to the Tribe the entire relief that it sought.
C.

The Supreme Courts Decision

The Supreme Court granted Idaho's petition for a writ of certiorari'0 5 to consider whether an action against state officers for injunctive and declaratory relief, when such relief requires adjudication of a
state's equal footing title and will deprive the state of all practical benefits of ownership of the disputed waters and submerged lands, may
proceed under the Exparte Young doctrine. 10 6 Also briefed by the parties, but not addressed by the Court, was whether the President of the
United States, acting without explicit congressional authority, can
convey title to the beds, banks, and submerged lands to an Indian
102
103

See id.at 1254.
See id. at 1255.

104

See id. The Ninth Circuit also held that the district court's dismissal of the

Tribe's complaint for failure to state a claim was improper because the Tribe could
have conceivably proven facts that it held title pursuant to the 1873 Executive Order.
See id. at 1256-57.
105 See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 116 S. Ct. 1415 (1996).

106 The Court denied the Tribe's petition for writ of certiorari. See Coeur d'Alene
Tribe v. Idaho, 116 S. Ct. 1416 (1996). The Court also denied the Tribe's cross petition for certiorari, in which the Tribe argued as follows: A state can define its sovereignty any way it wishes. Idaho had defined its sovereignty in a limited way as a result
of holdings by the Idaho Supreme Court that quiet title actions against the State did

not impinge upon its sovereignty. Consequently, the Eleventh Amendment posed no
barrier to the Tribe's quiet title action because the amendment protects a state's sovereignty, and this suit, by Idaho's own admission, did not even touch upon that sover-

eignty. See Brief for Respondent at 3, Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 117 S.
Ct. 2028 (1997) (No. 94-1474) (citations omitted).
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tribe, thereby overcoming the strong presumption in favor of a state's
entitlement to such lands under the Equal Footing Doctrine.
1. The Principal Opinion
Justice Kennedy, joined only by Chief Justice Rehnquist, began
the principal opinion by laying the groundwork for his attempt to
reconfigure the Exparte Young exception into a case-specific balancing
test.'0 7 Justice Kennedy explained that the purpose of the Eleventh
Amendment is to limit the jurisdictional reach of Article Ill courts;
the amendment, in essence, recognizes the broad concept of sovereign immunity implicit in the Constitution. 10 8 Within this framework,
Ex parte Young is an important exception to the Eleventh Amendment,
but applying an "empty" formalistic interpretation of the doctrine
whenever prospective declaratory and injunctive relief is sought
against a state officer would be inconsistent with and offensive to the
broader principles of state sovereignty.' 0 9
Given this characterization of Young's role, Justice Kennedy declared it unsurprising that Youngjurisdiction has generally been extended in two instances. "The first is when there is no state forum
available to vindicate federal interests, thereby placing upon Article
III courts the special obligation to ensure the supremacy of federal
statutory and constitutional law."" 0 In looking to Exparte Youngitself
for support, Justice Kennedy conceded that the ultimate question in
that case was whether Minnesota's attorney general could be enjoined
from enforcing an allegedly unconstitutional state law fixing railroad
fares."' Material to the Court's decision to extend federal jurisdiction, however, was the burden the shareholders would bear by being
107 Throughout his opinion, Justice Kennedy referred to Ex parte Young as the
"Young exception," apparently to emphasize his view of the doctrine as subservient to

the Eleventh Amendment. He also expressly condemned the Court's continued reliance on Young's well-known fiction, indicating that its nature as a fiction counsels
hesitance in its application. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2034

(1997).
108 See id at 2033.
109 See i. at 2034 ("The real interests served by the Eleventh Amendment are not
to be sacrificed to elementary mechanics of captions and pleadings. Application of
the, Young exception must reflect a proper understanding of its role in our federal
system and respect for state courts instead of a reflexive reliance on an obvious

fiction.").
110 Rd at 2035 ("[Piroviding a federal forum for ajusticiable controversy is a specific application of the principle that the plan of the convention contemplates a re-

gime in which federal guarantees are enforceable so long as there is a justiciable
controversy.").
111 Id.
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forced to wait until Attorney General Young initiated a state enforcement proceeding in order to challenge the scheme, as well as the
"grave risk," run by the railroads' officials, of heavy fines and imprisonment mandated by the regulatory scheme if they failed in their
challenge to the statute.1 1 2 Because, however, Idaho's courts were
open to and offered the Tribe an adequate remedy, Justice Kennedy
stated that the Tribe could not avail itself of this justification to gain
13
entry into a federal forum.'
Acknowledging that even if an available state forum could provide a plaintiff with an adequate remedy, Justice Kennedy stated that
Youngjurisdiction has also traditionally been extended when a dispute
calls for the interpretation of federal law, that is, when federal intervention affirms "the interest in having federal rights vindicated in federal courts." 4 Justice Kennedy stated that a federal forum assures a
peaceful resolution in disputes between two states, suits initiated by
the United States against a state, as well as in several other circumstances that he did not identify, but he attacked this justification as
potentially leading to an "expansive application of the Young exception."' 1 5 This justification, Justice Kennedy stated, is tantamount to
basing judicial practice on the assumption that state courts are inherently inferior to federal courts, a precept that conflicts with the basic
tenets of federalism." 6 Justice Kennedy explained that no detriment
inures to the Supremacy Clause if a federal-question case is heard in a
state rather than in a federal court; after all, he added, Article III
courts did not obtain federal-question jurisdiction until 1875.117 Furthermore, federal statutory and constitutional law, he explained, cannot be viewed as "a body of law external to the States, acknowledged
112 See id. (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 166 (1908)). Illustrative that
Youngwas not the sole case to rely on the inadequacy or unavailability of a state forum
as justification to extend federal jurisdiction, Justice Kennedy cited Osborn v. Bank of
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 842-43 (1824) (explaining that if it was within
the power of the plaintiff to make the State a party to the suit it would "certainly [be]
true" that a suit against state officials would be barred, but if the "real principal" is
"exempt from all judicial process" an officer suit could proceed); United States v. Lee,
106 U.S. 196 (1882) (permitting suit for injunctive relief to proceed where there did
not otherwise exist a legal remedy for the alleged trespass); Poindexterv. Greenhow, 114
U.S. 270, 299 (1885) (explaining that the statelaw remedy for Virginia's unconstitutional refusal to accept its own bond coupons in satisfaction of state taxes was, in fact,

"no remedy"). See Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2035.
113 Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2036.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 2036-37.
116 See id. at 2037.
117 See id.
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and enforced simply as a matter of comity. The Constitution is the
basic law of the Nation, a law to which a State's ties are no less intiu 8 Here, howmate than those of the National Government itself.""
ever, the Tribe is simply attempting to invoke federal principles to
challenge a state administrative action. 1 9 Because this dispute "has
features which instruct and enrich the elaboration of the state's administrative law," Justice Kennedy believed that it would be best adjudged by Idaho's courts, which would benefit measurably by
integrating the federal principles "within [its] own system for the
20
proper judicial control of [its] state officials."'
After confining the extension of Young jurisdiction to the two
aforesaid instances, Justice Kennedy segued to his main argument.
The Court's recent Young cases, he asserted, illustrate that the Court
was engaged in "a careful balancing and accommodation of state interests."' 21 In other words, courts must carefully measure whether
granting the plaintiff in a state-officer suit access to a federal forum
would cause such an affront to the state's sovereignty that it would
"upset the balance of federal and state interests" embodied in the
122
Young exception.
In balancing the federal and state interests, Justice Kennedy
painted the Tribe's claim as unusual in that the claim is "close to the
functional equivalent of a quiet tifle [action] in that substantially all
benefits of ownership and control would shift from the State to the
Tribe.' 23 Furthennore, Justice Kennedy found the claim to be "especially troubling" in that the relief sought by the Tribe would divest
Idaho of its sovereign control of the submerged lands, which hold "a
118 Id. ("It would be error coupled with irony were we to bypass the Eleventh
Amendment, which enacts a scheme solicitous of the States, on the sole rationale that
state courts are inadequate to enforce and interpret federal rights in every case.").

119 See id.
120
121

Id. at 2037-38.
Id. at 2038.

122 See id. As supporting this balancing test, Justice Kennedy cited Quern v. Jordan,
440 U.S. 332 (1979), Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977), Edelman v. Jordan,415
U.S. 651 (1974), and Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
This balancing approach, Justice Kennedy added, was recently affirmed in Seminole
Tribeby the Court's analogy of the Youngline of cases to the Bivens line. See supranote
64. Justice Kennedy explained that the Seminole Tribe Court's analogy of the lifting of
the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar to the creation of a Bivens remedy in

Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988), "reflect[s] a sensitivity to varying contexts,
and courts should consider whether there are 'special factors counseling hesitation'"
in answering the inquiry in either situation. Coeurd'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2038-39 (citations omitted).

123

Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2040.
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unique status in the law and [are] infused with a public trust the State
' 24
itself is bound to respect."
Justice Kennedy supplemented the district court's historical narrative about the applicability of the Equal Footing Doctrine, 125 by
stressing that the doctrine, as well as the tie between submerged lands
and state sovereignty, traces its pedigree back to the Institutes of Justinian and to the Magna Carta.126 And although America adopted
much of its law respecting navigable waters from English law, Justice
Kennedy emphasized that America's deeper reverence for these waterways is evidenced by its expansion of the doctrine's scope. 127
Justice Kennedy found that Idaho, through its enactment of numerous regulations respecting Lake Coeur d'Alene, especially those
regulations for the preservation of the lake for public and commercial
benefit, evidenced its recognition of the degree to which its submerged lands are integrally related to its sovereignty. 128 Given this
unique relationship, extension of Young jurisdiction would work an
affront to the dignity of Idaho and to its position in the Union. 129
Thus, Justice Kennedy concluded, the Eleventh Amendment prohibited the Tribe's action for declaratory and injunctive relief against
Idaho's officials from proceeding in federal court.13 0
2. Justice O'Connor's Concurrence
Joined in her concurrence byJustices Scalia and Thomas, Justice
O'Connor began her opinion in agreement with the principal opinion to the extent that the Tribe's claim is distinct from the typical Ex
parte Young action.' 3 1 In the first respect, by seeking to extinguish all
existing regulations and ordinances affecting and the State's regulatory authority over Lake Coeur d'Alene, the Tribe, Justice O'Connor
believed, asserted the "functional equivalent" of a quiet title action
124 Id. at 2040-41. "To pass this off as a judgment causing little or no offense to
Idaho's sovereign authority and its standing in the Union would be to ignore the
realities of the relief the Tribe demands." Id at 2040.
125 See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.

126

See Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2041.

127 See id. at 2041-42. For example, although English law recognized that some
private landowners retained title to certain navigable waters while allowing the public
a right of passage, American law has never recognized such private ownership.
Neither did American law recognize any of the distinctions made in English law betveen the Crown's rights and the public's rights in submerged lands. See id. at 2042.

128
129
130
131

See id. at 2042-43.
See id. at 2043.
See id.
See id&
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against the State.'3 2 Such suits, as Treasure Salvorshas made dear, are
133
barred from proceeding in federal court.
The second difference Justice O'Connor found between the
Tribe's claim and that in an ordinary Young suit, is that the Tribe did
not seek disposition of its interest in "an ordinary parcel of real property."13 4 Rather, submerged lands, the peculiar kind of land to which
the Tribe claimed tifle, have been emphasized repeatedly by the Court
3
and throughout history as inextricably tied to state sovereignty.
In light of the uniqueness of the Tribe's claim, Justice O'Connor
believed that the precedents upon which the Tribe relied were inapposite. 1 36 She acknowledged the prior cases in which the Court had
allowed ejectment actions to proceed in a federal forum against state
37
and federal officers who had unconstitutionally seized private land.
She, however, distinguished those cases from the Tribe's claim, stating
that in the prior cases the respective sovereigns were divested only of
their possession of the property, but they were not divested of their
regulatory authority over those lands. 138 Because the Tribe sought to
remove completely the submerged lands from Idaho's sovereign jurisdiction, the relief would impact Idaho to the extent that the state must
be considered the real party in interest and the suit therefore barred
by the Eleventh Amendment. 39
Justice O'Connor used the remaining two-thirds of her concurrence to criticize Justice Kennedy's attempt to reconfigure the Young
doctrine from a straightforward inquiry to a case-by-case balancing
test. She argued that although the lack of adequate state relief may be
incident to a number of Young cases, it has never been a threshold
question in pursuit of injunctive relief.' 40 She highlighted Justice
Kennedy's admission that the cases he cited did not principally rely on
132

See id.
at 2043-44.

133

See UeL

134 Id. at 2044.
135 See id.Justice O'Connor joined with the principal opinion's discussion of the
importance of the relationship between submerged lands and state sovereignty as embodied in the Equal Footing Doctrine.
136 See id.
Justice O'Connor agreed withJustice Kennedy's reason for rejecting the
Tribe's reliance on Treasure Salvors, believing the controlling issue in that case to be
that Florida's officials lacked a "colorable basis under state law" for claiming 25% of
the artifacts; that is, the officials were acting outside the scope of the authority conferred upon them by the state, notwithstanding that the title to the artifacts rested on
federal law. Id137 See/a
138 See id139 See id. at 2043-44.
140 See iLat 2045.
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the absence of an available state forum as a rationale for applying
Young.141 More importantly, she asserted that Young itself, as well as
two factually similar cases on which Young's holding is based, allowed
federal injunction suits to proceed even though the states had waived
their immunity from suit in their own forums, because the states were
not the real defendant in interest. 142 Justice O'Connor concluded
that Justice Kennedy misinterpreted the Young inquiry, and she reiterated that a court's concern is not whether a state forum offering adequate relief is available, but whether, in such a suit, the state is the real
143
party in interest.
Justice O'Connor next agreed with the principal opinion that
one of the underlying justifications of Ex parte Young is that it promotes federal interests by having federal cases decided by federal
courts.1 44 However, she found Justice Kennedy's assertion that it is
immaterial for purposes of the Supremacy Clause whether a federal
suit is brought in a state or in a federal forum to be patently inconsistent with the theoretical underpinnings of the Young doctrine and
with state-federal jurisprudential philosophy. 145 This precept, she asserted, in no way equates to the proposition, which the principal opinion deems to follow afortiori,that state courts cannot capably interpret
and apply federal law. 146 The theory behind the supremacy of federal
law never has been based on the characterization that it involves the
denigration of the state courts' abilities.1 47 Rather, inherent in the
notion of preserving the supremacy of federal law is that, while state
courts are not inferior, the nature of state relief is.148
In addressing Justice Kennedy's central conclusion, Justice
O'Connor argued that the Court's more current Young cases stand not
for the case-by-case balancing approach he advocated, but rather for
the proposition that a court's duty is merely to determine whether the
remedy sought by a plaintiff who alleges an ongoing violation of federal statutory or constitutional law is more akin to the permissible prospective relief granted in Ex parte Young than to impermissible
retroactive relief.149 Nothing Justice O'Connor found in the Court's
141 See id.
142 See id. (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 153-54 (1908)).
143 See id (citing Young, 209 U.S. at 154).
144 See id.
145 See id at 2045-46
146 See id. at 2046.
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 See id. at 2046-47. Justice O'Connor criticized Justice Kennedy's reliance on
Seminole Tribe's analogy between Young and Bivens actions, arguing that such reliance
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Young jurisprudence supported "the proposition that federal courts
must evaluate the importance of the federal right at stake before permitting an officer's suit to proceed."' 5 0
Justice O'Connor, despite stressing that the principal opinion
needlessly mischaracterized much of the Court's Youngjurisprudence,
concluded that when a plaintiff attempts to strip a state of its complete
regulatory authority over submerged lands, the state is essentially
placed as the real defendant in interest and the suit is barred from
federal court by the Eleventh Amendment. 5 1
3. Justice Souter's Dissent
Although labeled the dissent, Justice Souter's opinion was joined
by three other Justices, 15 2 a larger number than adhered to either the
principal or the concurring opinion. And in contrast to his lengthy
and thorough dissertation in Seminole Tribe about the history of federalism and the role of state sovereignty, yet with only a limited discussion of Ex parte Young, here Justice Souter concisely outlined his view
of the Young doctrine, affirming its strict, formalistic application as an
essential counterbalance to the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional
bar.
Justice Souter echoed Justice O'Connor's opinion by initially
chiding Justice Kennedy for his attempt to replace the formalistic Ex
parte Young inquiry with a case-specific balancing test.' 53 He then
chided both opinions for their unnecessary and unwarranted attempts
"to redefine and reduce the substance of federal subject-matter jurisdiction to vindicate federal rights."1 5 4 Justice Souter explained that
when Young has not been displaced by Congress, or what a court
deems to be congressional intent, whether a court should extend federal jurisdiction involves a straightforward, two-prong inquiry: First,
courts must determine whether the plaintiff has alleged an ongoing
violation of his or her federal statutory or constitutional rights. Second, he or she must seek forward-looking relief in order to address
the violation. 155 The Tribe, Justice Souter concluded, satisfied this
inquiry.
on one lone citation to a Bivens action is in no way supportive of importing a case-bycase balancing approach into Youngjurisprudence. Id. at 2047.
150 Id. at 2047.

151

See id.

152 Joining Justice Souter in his dissent were Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and

Breyer.
153

See Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2048.

154 Id.
155 See id-
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Justice Souter argued, in contrast to the principal opinion's apparent assertion that the Tribe's claim to the submerged lands was
better characterized as a state administrative action, that the title to
the lands, as the State had admitted, 156 is dearly governed by federal
law.157 Not only does the Tribe's right to exclusive possession depend
on whether the 1873 Executive Order validly conveyed the submerged
lands to the Tribe, but also Idaho has no legitimate authority to enforce its statutes, regulations, and ordinances affecting the land absent
158
the authorization conferred by federal law.
At this point in his analysis, Justice Souter noted that the Tribe's
claim differs from Ex parte Young itself in that this action concerns the
Tribe's claim of title to real property in which a state also claims an
interest. 159 This difference, he asserted, is immaterial and has never
been used to deny a plaintiff Young jurisdiction. 160 United States v.
Lee16 1 and Tindal v. Wesley1 62 have already outlined the proper inquiry

in a Young action to determine whether a state is the real party in
interest when the plaintiff claims title to real property also claimed by
the state. 163 In Lee, General Robert E. Lee's son brought an ejectment
action against officers of the federal government for seizing and occupying his property allegedly in violation of the Constitution. 164 The
Lee Court rejected the officers' assertion that they were entitled to immunity by virtue of the federal government's authorization of their
actions. 165 Although Lee concerned an alleged unconstitutional
seizure of real property by federal officials, Tindal held that the same
inquiry applies even when the suit is for disposition of one's property
interest against a state.166 Therefore, Justice Souter summarized, so
long as a plaintiff's title claim rests on federal statutory or constitu156 See id.at 2049 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 25, Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe,
117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997) (No. 94-1474) ("[T]he underlying authorization for the actions of the named officials is not the state statutes [regulating] the disputed lands,
but rather the Idaho Admission Act and the United States Constitution. State titie to
submerged lands is the result of federal action in admitting a state to the Union.")).
157 See id
158 See id. at 2050.
159 See id. at 2049. Justice Souter directed the majority of his analysis not toward
the narrow issue of "submerged lands," but rather toward attacking the broader con-

cept of creating a real property exception to Ex parte Young.
160 See id. at 2050.
161
162
163

106 U.S. 196 (1882).
167 U.S. 204 (1897).
See Coeur d'Alene, 117 S.Ct. at 2050.

164 See id.
165
166

See id. (citing Lee, 106 U.S. at 220).
See id (citing Tinda4 167 U.S. at 213).
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tional law, prior Court precedents have shown that the claim differs
none "from any other legal or constitutional matter that may have to
be resolved in deciding whether the officer of an immune government is so acting beyond his authority as to be amenable to suit with1 67
out necessarily implicating his government.
Next, Justice Souter concluded that the relief sought by the Tribe
is prospective in nature, thus passing the second prong and deserving
of Youngjurisdiction. The Tribe, he pointed out, sought only to end
Idaho's regulation of the land, which the Tribe claimed is inconsistent
with federal law; it did not seek damages for past infringement to its
title, and thus vitiated concerns of an end run around Edelman.'68 Justice Souter conceded that the Tribe's requested relief would have "significant consequences to the state," but such is true whenever Young
applies.' 69 The relief here would merely end a regulatory regime that,
according to federal law, Idaho allegedly had no right to maintain,
but such relief cannot reposition the State as the real party in interest
"so long as its burden upon the State is merely a 'necessary consequence of [the officers'] compliance in the future with a substantive
federal-question determination." 7 0 Justice Souter remarked that by
finding the relief sought by the Tribe to run against the State, Justices
Kennedy and O'Connor apparently confuse the cost of Idaho's compliance with federal law with its character as merely prospective. 171
The bulk ofJustice Souter's opinion treated submerged lands as a
subset of all property, and he directed his argument toward the general proposition that Young suits requesting disposition of a claim of
title to property, real or personal, are not "unique." To the extent
that he addressed submerged lands particularly, he again argued that
their uniqueness is irrelevant in the Young context. 7 2 The only examination that the Court must undertake, regardless of the underlying
subject matter of the suit, is whether the defendant state's officers are
exercising "ultra vires" authority over the submerged lands. 173 As long
as that threshold inquiry is answered in the affirmative, a federal forum must be offered notwithstanding that the relief, if granted, would
place the disputed lands outside the state's regulatory jurisdiction. 174
167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174

Id
See
Id
Id
See
See
See
See

id. at 2051.
(quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668 (1974)).
id.
id at 2053-54.
id. at 2054.
id.
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Justice Souter concluded that "l[t] his is a perfect example of a suit
for relief cognizable under Ex parte Young.' 175 In adhering to precedent, however, the jurisdictional line must be drawn short of allowing
the Tribe to proceed with a quiet title action or by prohibiting Idaho
from adjudicating title to the lands in a future action, else such relief
would run directly against Idaho. 176 So long as Idaho is free, at its
pleasure, to litigate in a future action its title to the disputed lands, the
77
Tribe's suit should be allowed to proceed in federal court.'
V.

ANALYSIS

The three opinions in Coeur d'Alene essentially provide a panoramic set of views regarding federalism, the Eleventh Amendment,
state sovereignty, and Ex parte Young. The principal opinion allows
Justice Kennedy and ChiefJustice Rehnquist to indulge in an exploration of, in the context of Ex parte Young, the outer contours of the
federal-state balance of power and to engage in ample historical and
legal revision in marking this outer boundary strongly in favor of the
states. The two supplant the traditional Young inquiry, whether the
state is the real party in interest, with a new inquiry that seeks to determine whether the broader principles of federalism would be disturbed if the Young claim were allowed to proceed in a federal
forum. 178 Justice Souter's dissent serves as the perfect foil to the prin175 Id. at 2049.
176 See id.at 2051-52. ("It is a judgment to the effect only that, as between the
plaintiff and the defendants, the former is entitled to possession of the property in
question, the latter having shown no valid authority to withhold possession from the
plaintiff."). Id. (quoting Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U.S. 204, 223 (1897)).
177 See id. at 2052.
178 Except for Young claims in which an adequate state forum is unavailable, Justice Kennedy's balancing test would find Youngjurisdiction to exist in very few instances. This aforementioned first prong of Justice Kennedy's vague, three-prong
balancing test provides for the automatic extension of federal jurisdiction if a state
forum that could provide to the plaintiff adequate relief is unavailable. Provided that
an adequate state forum does exist, the second prong asks whether federal courtjurisdiction is necessary to ensure the supremacy of federal law. Justice Kennedy, however, has already answered this question in the negative by characterizing this precept
as tantamount to belittling the ability of state courts to interpret and to apply federal
law. Assuming these first two prongs do not justify the provision of a federal forum,
courts must then determine, by weighing a number of undefined factors, whether
allowing the suit to proceed in a federal forum would upset the balance of federal and
state interests. The magnitude of the affront required to upset that balance is indeterminable from Justice Kennedy's opinion. While Treasure Salvors held that Young suits
to quiet title to property also claimed by a state are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, Justice Kennedy carefully stated that the Tribe's requested relief was "close to,"
but was not the "functional equivalent" of a quiet title claim. Earlier in his opinion,
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cipal opinion's pro-federalist bent by ardently espousing an automatic
extension of Youngjurisdiction whenever a plaintiff seeks prospective
relief against a state official in order to redress an on-going violation
of federal statutory or constitutional law.
Charting a more moderate course between the principal's near
exenteration of Young and the dissent's reaffirmation of Young's necessity as a safeguard to ensure the supremacy of federal law and as a
check against abuses by the states, Justice O'Connor's controlling
opinion must be read as defining the current boundary between permissible and impermissible extensions of Young jurisdiction and as
providing clues regarding the direction of the Court's future Young
jurisprudence. To begin with, certainly actions in which a private
plaintiff seeks a federal forum for the adjudication of his or her claim
to title in submerged lands are now outside the ambit of Young. In
carving out this small exception, Justice O'Connor rested her opinion
on a quite narrow foundation. The first pillar composing that foundation treats the nature of the relief requested by the Tribe as the functional equivalent of a quiet title claim. The Tribe's attempt to force
Idaho to rescind both its possession of and its authority to regulate the
disputed lands, from Justice O'Connor's vantage point, would award
to the Tribe relief that is essentially "indistinguishable" from an award
that would quiet title to the disputed lands in the Tribe. 179 In other
words, the Tribe sought all the incidents of ownership of the land, yet
it simply did not use the impermissible "quiet title" label on its
complaint.
The second, and the troubling pillar upon which Justice
O'Connor rested her opinion, is the well-established relationship of
submerged lands to state sovereignty. 8 0 Justice O'Connor's inclusion
of this postulate as essential to supporting her ultimate conclusion
represents the point of departure between her and Justice Souter.
Although this divergence is relatively small, a broad reading ofJustice
O'Connor's opinion, with a concomitant strong reliance on the historical significance of submerged lands, could be interpreted as steerhowever, Justice Kennedy stated that the Tribe's claim "is the functional equivalent"

of a quiet title claim. Whether the distinction between these two statements is irrelevant andJustice Kennedy agreed withJustice O'Connor that the Tribe's claim rose to
the level of a quiet title action, the overall tenor of his opinion suggests that his and
ChiefJustice Rehnquist's conception of a state's pain threshold is much lower than
the Court's previous conception, and thus a Young claim measuring less than a quiet
tide action would likely present the requisite affront to a state's sovereignty in order
to preclude the extension of Youngjurisdiction. Id. at 2035-40.

179 See itd at 2044-45.
180 See supra notes 86-91, 125-27 and accompanying text.
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ing the Court's Youngjurisprudence toward a new test (one that is less
free-form than Justice Kennedy's, but one for which he and ChiefJustice Rehnquist would likely settle): Young suits would be barred if the
underlying subject matter of the complaint implicates interests in
which the states have historically possessed a strong sovereign concern. By drawing on this slightly narrower variation of the principal
opinion's balancing test, lower federal courts could begin working a
major retrenchment in Young's scope, essentially rewriting the Young
inquiry and thereby rebalancing federal-state power.
The creation of numerous exceptions to the Young doctrine logically follows from Justice O'Connor's importation of the historical inquiry. In fact, using Ex parte Young itself as a model, it is easy to
demonstrate that this very case is ripe for liquidation. Like any state,
Minnesota most certainly believes that essential to its sovereignty is its
ability to regulate economic activity within its borders. In particular,
in the early 1900s, it surely believed that its regulation of railway rates
was necessary to maintain a healthy economic environment, to prevent economic abuses, and thereby to promote the public welfare. In
addition, no activity identifies Minnesota's character as an independent sovereign i8 1 more than its provision of heavy fines and imprisonment for those railroad company officers who violated the railway
regulations. The Young Court's decision, however, left Minnesota unable to maintain its rate-setting schemes. Yet, as Justice Souter observed: "A state obliged to choose between the power to regulate a
lake bed on an Indian reservation and power to regulate economic
affairs and punish offenders would not (knowing nothing more)
choose the lake."'182 Viewed pragmatically then, one can readily craft
a very strong argument, using the same principles on which Justice
O'Connor's argument proceeds, to preclude federal jurisdiction over
a state-officer suit anytime the underlying subject matter of that suit
concerns some facet of a state's authority that has an established pedigree and is of practical importance.
This importation of an historical inquiry also can be read as moving Justice O'Connor's opinion much closer ideologically to the principal opinion, supplanting the formalistic extension of Young
jurisdiction with a slightly more narrow, but nonetheless, case-specific
balancing approach. Even this narrow test is inconsistent with the theoretical underpinnings of the Young doctrine, whose very creation

181

See Coeur d'Alene, 117 U.S. at 2054 (Souter, J., dissenting).

182

Id.
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represented a balancing of federal-state interests. 183 Young is a compromise between absolute state sovereignty and unrestricted freedom
to hale a state into another sovereign's forum, thereby upsetting the
balance of federal-state power that the Founding Fathers had, and
subsequently the courts have, struggled to strike. The grafting onto
Young of additional inquiries, historical or otherwise, unnecessarily
disrupts this delicate balance. Moreover, Justice O'Connor's opinion
appears to equate the invasiveness of the Tribe's prayed for relief with
the retrospectivity of relief. Her reasoning posits that the greater the
degree to which the invasiveness of the requested relief, regardless of
its prospectivity, infringes upon historically sovereign state interests,
the more it partakes of the nature of impermissible retrospective relief.' 84 But equating invasiveness with retrospectivity is a distinction
that has never been used to find a state as the real defendant in interest in a Young suit,185 and making it so works a narrowing of the
Court's established Youngjurisprudence. Lastly, by measuring the historical significance of the underlying subject matter of a Young claim,
Justice O'Connor is essentially balancing the principles of federalism
versus the right of a private party, who alleges to be the victim of a
federal constitutional or statutory violation, to litigate in federal court,
precluding that right and relegating it to second-class status if it happens to infringe upon a well-established aspect of the states' sovereignty. The Constitution, however, does not prioritize protected
rights, and it would be unprecedented for Justice O'Connor to begin
183 See LAURENc:E H. TRmE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-25, at 173 (2d ed.
1988) ("The eleventh amendment lies at the center of the tension between state sovereign immunity and the desire to have in place mechanisms for the effective vindication of federal rights. The Supreme Court has negotiated this tension both by resort
to legal fictions and through complex and often counterintuitive interpretations of
the eleventh amendment that have made that amendment far more controversial
than its language would, on its face, suggest.").
184 This argument runs directly against that made byJustice Rehnquist in Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974), where he essentially argued that, in a Young suit, a
prospective award of $5.8 million from a state treasury is permissible, while a retroactive award of $132 was patently impermissible because of the great disruptive effect
that it would have on a state's budgetary process. See Burnham, supranote 41, at 561.
Although the former award is greatly invasive to the state's fisc, the control over which
is certainly of utmost sovereign importance to the state, the nature of the award, according to Justice Rehnquist's analysis, did not partake of retrospective relief merely
because of its invasiveness.
185 See Coeur d'Alene, 117 U.S. at 2055 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The exercise of
Young jurisdiction for vindicating individual federal rights is necessarily 'intrusive,'
simply because state officials sued under Young are almost always doing exactly what
their States' legislative and administrative authorities intend them to do.").
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classifying certain federal rights as more paramount and therefore
more deserving of protection than others.
Although such a reading of'Justice O'Connor's opinion is entirely
plausible, her reliance on the historical significance of submerged
lands appears to be of no real importance to her opinion or to the
Court's future Young jurisprudence. The historical inquiry is likely
surplusage, added in an attempt to solidify her conclusion. The aforementioned consequences that progress from her reasoning are too
sharply inconsistent with her explicit reaffirmation of a formalistic application of Young and with her vigorous criticism of Justice Kennedy's
attempt to narrow the Court's Youngjurisprudence to be read otherwise. 186 Indeed, her opinion carries no indication that she, or the
justices joining her, have taken or are ready to take the requisite steps
needed to uproot "broadly and deeply established traditions. 1

87

If

Justice O'Connor had desired to block, to a larger set of state-officer
suits, the avenue to a federal forum made available by Young, she
could have avoided her problematic reasoning by accepting Idaho's
88
argument that there be a real property exception to Exparte Young.1
Indeed, Justice O'Connor implicitly, if not explicitly, answered in the
negative whether such a real property exception should be created.
In distinguishing the Tribe's claim from those in Lee and Tindai the
two chestnut cases in which the Court allowed ejectment actions to
proceed in federal court against government officials whose possession of the plaintiffs' land was allegedly in violation of federal constitutional law, 18 9 Justice O'Connor in no way questioned their validity.
She merely argued that liquidating a state's ability to exercise its regulatory authority over lands was a breed of relief never before allowed
in a Young suit, and, combined with dispossessing Idaho of the land,
would essentially comprise the component parts of a quiet title action.
Justice O'Connor strongly concluded that the Young doctrine is, I 9°
186 Justice Kennedy's dissertation about the historical significance of submerged
lands to the sovereignty of the states was, of course, essential in his effort, during the

balancing phase of its three-part test, to establish that the invasiveness of the Tribe's
requested relief would present such an affront to Idaho's sovereignty that allowing the
Tribe to present its case in a federal forum would threaten Idaho's position in the

Union. Given Justice O'Connor's reasoning, this necessity is clearly not present in
her concurrence.
187 Meltzer, supra note 32, at 43.
188 See Brief for Petitioner at 22, Coeur dAlene Tribe (No. 94-1474) (arguing that the

state is the "real, substantial party in interest" in any Young claim seeking disposition
of title to real property in which the state also claims an interest).
189 See supra notes 161-66 and accompanying text.
190 See Coeurd'Alene, 117 U.S. at 2047 ("I would not narrow our Young doctrine, but
I would not extend it to reach this case.").
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and should remain, one of straightforward application' 9 1 in order to
counterbalance the Eleventh Amendment's restrictive jurisdictional
barrier.
It was assuredly easier forJustices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas
to find the relief requested by the Tribe as rising to the functional
equivalent of an impermissible quiet title claim given that their similar
jurisprudential philosophies in the arena of federalism left them
predisposed to Idaho's claims. In the short number of years he has
been on the Court, Justice Thomas has shown a strong desire to restrain the federal government from interfering with the states' autonomy to handle their own affairs. 192 Justice O'Connor, in her own
right, has long been committed to defending state interests from federal encroachment, 193 and as a former member of the Arizona State
Senate, she likely held some sympathy for Idaho's efforts to prevent
the Tribe from removing a large portion of property from the State's
sovereign jurisdiction. To reach her desired result, Justice O'Connor
simply moved an extraordinarily narrow set of cases outside Young's
scope, while reaffirming Young's underlying tenets. Tacking the submerged lands inquiry onto her argument most probably was an expedlient way in which to solidify her conclusion while confining her
holding to the particular facts of Coeur d'Alene and thus doing little, if
any, practical damage to the Young doctrine.
The third member of this troikaJustice Scalia, has himself been a
consistent defender of state interests in cases involving Eleventh
Amendment immunity, 194 and this despite the textualist-historical perspective of his jurisprudence. 195 Justice Kennedy's near pronouncement of absolute state sovereign immunity would intuitively suggest
that the principal opinion would attract Justice Scalia's adherence.
191 See id. ("In sum, the principal opinion replaces a straightforward inquiry into
whether a complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective with a vague balancing test that purports to account
for a 'broad' range of unspecified factors.").

192 See Christopher E. Smith, Clarence Thomas: A DistinctiveJustice, 28

SETON HALL

L. REV. 1, 13 (1997).

193 See M. David Gelfand & Keith Werhan, Federalism and Separation of Powers on a
"Conservative" Court: Currents and Cross-Currentsfrom Justices O'Connor and Scalia, 64

TUL. L. REv. 1443, 1448-49 (1990).
194 See Gelfand & Werhan, supra note 193, at 1458.
195 Despite the paucity of support for Hans in the text of the Eleventh Amendment, Justice Scalia has explained "that state immunity from suit in federal courts is a
structural component of federalism," which "was part of the understood background
against which the Constitution was adopted, and which its jurisdictional provisions
did not mean to sweep away." Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1, 38, 32 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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But the balancing test that the principal opinion pronounced is antithetical to Justice Scalia's jurisprudential philosophy. Strict rules of
law, not discretionary balancing tests are Justice Scalia's preferred solution to a constitutional dispute. 1 96 Although Justice Scalia has conceded that he himself is guilty of promulgating some balancing tests,
in this case Justice Kennedy's test is so ill-defined that it would lead to
the unpalatable result of not the Supreme Court deciding the law governing the application of Ex parte Young, but the numerous individual
appellate and district courts rewriting the doctrine haphazardly in
their efforts to apply the nebulous test. 197 Just as important, nothing
indicates that Justice Scalia accepts Justice Kennedy's philosophy that
Ex parte Young is a limited doctrine, subservient to the Eleventh
Amendment and applicable only in several well-defined circumstances. Consequently, Justice Scalia would feel more comfortable
ideologically by joining justice O'Connor's more moderate
opinion. 198
Taking an overview of the Court's most recent Young jurisprudence, one cannot read Coeur dAlene in conjunction with Seminole
Tribe as marking the first small steps on the path toward a larger retrenchment, if not a complete preclusion, of private party suits against
state officers. The majority in Seminole Tribe, when vitiating Congress'
Article I authority to abrogate the states' immunity from suit in federal court, stated that Ex parte Young still remained an essential mechanism by which to compel the states' compliance with federal law.' 99
Moreover, Justice Souter conceded that the Court's holding in Seminole Tribe "left the basic tenets of Ex parte Young untouched," leaving
Congress free to endorse Youngjurisdiction even in a subsequent suit
196 See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv.
1175 (1990). Basic to justice Scalia's jurisprudence is that cases be decided on broad
categorical rules, rather than by flexible case-by-case balancing tests such as the one
employed by Justice Kennedy. Such bright-line rules are preferred because they: (1)
promote uniformity of decisions and equal protection; (2) increase predictability; (3)
reduce arbitrary application of the laws; and (4) give the courts resolve to render
decisions that may be contrary to the popular will. See Gelfand & Werhan, supranote
193, at 1462; Scalia, supra, at 1178-80; see also Autumn Fox & Stephen R. McAllister,
An Eagle Soaring: The Jurisprudenceof Justice Antonin Scalia, 19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 223,
226 (1997).
197 See Scalia, supra note 196, at 1179.
198 Justice Thomas has not given much of an indication as to the degree to which
he favors bright-line rules over balancing tests, but if one reasons from his near identical voting record to that ofJustice Scalia, it is plausible to assume that he too would
prefer the limited exception propounded by Justice O'Connor rather than the freeform balancing test propounded by Justice Kennedy.
199 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131 n.14 (1996).
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by the Seminole Tribe. 20 0 Seminole Tribe arguably was simply an application of Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n,2 01 in which the Court read a comprehensive statutory remedial
scheme to preclude a § 1983202 remedy. 20 3 Ex parte Young is, after all,
essentially a § 1983 action. 20 4 Even Justice Souter agreed in his Seminole Tribe dissent that nothing precluded the ability of a court to require a clear statement or inference of congressional intent
authorizing Young suits regarding a piece of legislation before a federal court extended federal jurisdiction. 20 5 Pushing aside then justice
O'Connor's historical inquiry as superfluous to her true analysis, Coeur
d'Alene amounts to a de facto quiet title action, which is impermissible
under the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, read in conjunction, Seminole
Tribe and Coeur d'Alene mark no significant change in the Court's philosophy regarding the role of Ex parte Young in the federalist system.
These cases are better characterized as presenting unique factual situations that led to more cosmetic rather than to substantive restrictions
in the doctrine.
The trouble still lingering after Coeur d'Alene is the Supreme
Court's overall willingness to eliminate avenues into federal court. By
carving out small exceptions to Young, as well as limiting the conferral
200 See Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2048 (1997) (Souter, J.,
dissenting).

201 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
202 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (194) provides in part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
203 See David P. Currie, Ex parte Young After Seminole Tribe, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
547, 548-49 (1997). Currie approves of the doctrinal theory that, according to Sea
Clammers, a federal statutory remedy may expressly or implicitly limit or preclude relief under an Ex parte Young claim. Currie, however, disapproves of its application in
Seminole Tribe. The Seminole Tribe Court held that the application of Young was precluded by the section in the IGRA that authorized federal court actions against states.
The "essential characteristic" of an unconstitutional provision, however, is that it has
no effect. See id. at 549-50. Meltzer, however, argues that Youngjurisdiction can be
partially or completely precluded, expressly or impliedly by statute, and that the
Court in Seminole Tribe should have narrowed the remedy available against Governor
Chiles to the extent that it would have been congruent with that allowed by the IGRA.
See Meltzer, supra note 32, at 39-41.
204 See Currie, supra note 203, at 549.
205 Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1180 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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of federal court jurisdiction in other circumstances 20 6-such as over
implied rights of action and over § 1983 actions2 7-there are increasingly fewer instances in which private parties can enlist federal forums
in order to force the states' compliance with federal law. 20 8 This willingness, allowed to proceed unchecked, grants the states greater latitude in which to violate federal law without the specter of federal
forced compliance. 20 9

Moreover, the

debate remains unsettled

whether a state forum must be made available to hear state-officer
210
suits barred from a federal forum by the Eleventh Amendment.
Thus, while Coeur d/Alene signals no immediate threat to the continued
vitality of the Young doctrine, viewed in this broader context, whether
the doctrine will remain free from encroachment by the Court is arguably questionable.
Just as important as the Court's discussion of federal court jurisdiction and the role of Ex pane Young, the background facts underlying the Tribe's dispute with the State of Idaho present concerns
encompassing state-tribal relations, state gaming regulation, and environmental protection, and therefore cannot escape undiscussed.
206

See Meltzer, supra note 32, at 42 (noting that there has been a "considerable

contraction" of the availability of private remedies for violations of federal statutory
law, and a broad trend in the Court's march toward federalism, but believing that

trend to be overstated).
207 See id. (citing RIcHARD H.

FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 830-46, 1133-37(4th ed. 1996)).

208 SeeJackson, supra note 6, at 540-41 (noting that although the federal government may sue states in federal courts in order to vindicate federal laws, the federal
government cannot be relied upon to vindicate the rights of all its people).
209 See id.
210 See id at 504. Monaghan writes that in Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994), "a
unanimous Court made clear that state courts must provide adequate relief when
state officials deprive persons of their property in violation of federal law, irrespective
of 'the sovereign immunity States traditionally enjoy in their own courts.'"
Monaghan, supranote 32, at 125 (quoting Reich, 513 U.S. at 109-10). This statement
may be a severe stretch of Reich's holding, as that case and the antecedent cases on
which it relied were exclusively tax cases, and the Court did not expand its reasoning
to hold that for all deprivations of property by state officers in violation of federal law
a state forum must be available to afford an aggrieved party redress. Reich in particular dealt with the State of Georgia, which had held out a postdeprivation remedy for
taxpayers to recover unlawfully collected taxes, then later stated that this remedy did
not exist, thereby rendering the plaintiff unable to recover taxes that he had paid
under a state law violative of the federal Constitution. The Court, in the only language on point, though dicta in Reich, reaffirmed the limited proposition expounded
by Reich's antecedent cases, that the Due Process Clause requires that a state's courts
be available to afford a taxpayer recovery of state taxes extracted in contravention of
federal statutory or constitutional law, the state's sovereign immunity in its own courts
notwithstanding. See Reich, 513 U.S. at 109-12.
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Idaho Governor Phil Batt has throughout his tenure in office led the
vigorous opposition to the Coeur d'Alene's aggressive attempts to expand their gaming activities. The Tribe, which signed a tribal-state
gaming compact, pursuant to the IGRA, with Idaho in December of
1992,211 currently operates on its reservation a single complex that
houses a 1,200 seat bingo hall and 600 videogame machines.2 12 Governor Batt has conceded that the gaming activities conducted by the
Indian tribes throughout Idaho have generated millions of dollars in
revenue and have created hundreds of jobs, thereby revitalizing the
formerly depressed reservation economies. 2 13 On the other hand, he
believes that even legal forms of gambling promote crime, hurt families, and have "a tendency to impoverish those willing to gamble
before taking care of essential expenses." 214 In balancing these conflicting consequences, Governor Batt has staked out a moderate political position by advocating a "status quo" in the tribes' gaming
pursuits. He favors permitting current tribal gaming operations to
continue, but would prohibit any marked expansion of that activity.21 5
Since beginning their gaming operations in 1992, the Coeur d'Alene
have attracted recognition in the gaming industry for their aggressive
and prominent attempts to expand their gaming activities both inside
211 See Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Idaho, 842 F. Supp. 1268, 1271 (D. Idaho 1994)
(deciding the respective rights and obligations of the Coeur d'Alene, Kootenai, and
Nez Pierce Tribes and the State of Idaho under the IGRA).
212 See Tribe's OperationEarned $8 Million Last Year, DowJones News Service, Feb. 4,
1998, available in WL, ALLNEWSPLUS database [hereinafter Tribe's Operations]. In
1992, Idaho voters approved a state constitutional amendment that prohibits casino
gambling in the state. Under federal law, Indian tribes can engage in any gambling
activities that are legal elsewhere in the state, thus in Idaho, the Tribe is allowed to
conduct only lotteries, bingo, and horse, mule, and dog racing. See Court Rejects Indian
Appeal LAS VEGAS REvrm-JouRNAL, Oct. 12, 1995, availablein 1995 WL 5802554. The
State and the Tribe have been in a tug-of-war over whether the electronic pull-tab
machines operated by the Tribe are violative of the 1992 constitutional amendment
or are the equivalent of the state lottery and thus legal. See Batt Softens Stand on GamblingAcknowledging Economic Benefits to Tribe, Governor Callsfor Legislative Study, SpoxEsMAN R EVw, Feb. 27, 1997, at Al, available in 1997 WL 7704911 [hereinafter Batt
Softens Stand]. On March 7, 1997, the State legislature conceded the point to the
Tribe, abandoning legislation that would outlaw the video pull-tab machines, which
are the Tribe's most lucrative games. Yet, the state's anti-gambling forces, led by Governor Batt, did not waver in their desire to halt any future expansion of tribal gaming.
See Senate Panel Saves Face, Drops Gaming Legislation, IDAHO STATESMAN, Mar. 8, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 5428322.
213 See Batt Softens Stand, supra note 212.
214 Julie Titone, Coeurd'Alenes Drop Horse RacingIdea After GovernorExpresses Opposition, SPoKEsMAN RavIEw, Dec. 18, 1996, at Al, available in 1996 WL 15104596.
215 See id.
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and outside of Idaho's borders.2 1 6 Most recently, in early 1997, the
Tribe announced and immediately faced vigorous opposition to its
ambitious twenty-eight million dollar planned expansion of its current
gaming facilities; the Tribe is seeking to add a new area for electronic
gaming machines and a new bingo area that would double as a special
events center.2 1 7 Given the Tribe's reputation in the gaming industry,
it is arguable that a number of observers believed that motivating the
Tribe's quest to obtain the lands surrounding Lake Coeur d'Alene is a
desire to establish a gambling venue on the shores surrounding the
picturesque lake. Whether these background facts played even the
slightest role in the dispositions of the case as it rose through the
courts, an ancillary result thus far has been the prevention of any commercial development of the lands surrounding Lake Coeur d'Alene.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although resting on a legal fiction, the Ex parte Young doctrine
provides a necessary exception to the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar by allowing private plaintiffs access to a federal forum in
order to compel the compliance of state officials, and thereby the
states, with federal statutory and constitutional law. 218 This availability

of a federal forum assures lower federal courts of the opportunity to
vindicate the supremacy of federal statutory and constitutional law
and to curb abuses of that law by the states. 219 The majority of the
justices in Coeur d 'Alene reaffirmed this estimable role that Young plays
in the federalist system. However, the problematic aspect of Coeur
d'Alene, beyond the muddled reasoning of the controlling opinion, is
216 In 1994, the Coeur d'Alene sought to establish a play-by-phone lottery, but had
to abandon the plan after law-enforcement officials convinced telephone companies
not to provide the Tribe with a toll-free line for what the officials said was an illegal
game. See Tribe's Operations,supra note 212. In December of 1996, the Tribe scuttled
its plans to bring horse racing to Post Falls, Idaho, by buying the Coeur d'Alene Greyhound Park after the Governor's outspoken opposition. See Titone, supra note 214.
217 See IDAHO STATESMAN, Dec. 16 1997, at 5B, available in 1997 WL 15048482.
218 See, e.g., Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S.
139, 146 (1993) ("The doctrine of Ex parte Young... is regarded as carving out a
necessary exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity."); CHART-ES ALAN WiGH-r,
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 312 (5th ed. 1994) ("[T]he doctrine of Ex parte Young
seems indispensable to the establishment of constitutional government and the rule
of law.").
219 See Coeur d'Alene, 117 S. Ct. at 2055 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Federal
question jurisdiction turns on subject matter, not the need to do some job a state
court may wish to avoid; it addresses not the adequacy of a state judicial system, but
the responsibility of federal courts to vindicate what is supposed to be controlling
federal law."); supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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that the Court appears to be engaged in a critical reexamination,
spanning so far two cases, of the continued efficacy of the Young doctrine. Rather than concentrate on whether the plaintiff had pled the
requisite elements to satisfy an extension of Youngjurisdiction (seeking prospective or injunctive relief in order to remedy an allegedly
ongoing federal statutory or constitutional violation), the Court has
felt more content to engage in a debate over the importance of protecting the states' unique roles in the constitutional system versus the
22 0
importance of providing federal forums to resolve federal claims.
And the result of this debate in Coeur d'Alene, as well as in Seminole
Tribe, was the removal of a small set of state-officer claims from Young's
scope.
Against the broader tapestry of pro-federalist decisions that the
Court has woven, however, the Court has largely tempered its adjustment of the balance of power between federal and state governments
in the arena of Ex parte Young. In Coeur d'Alene specifically, although
the Court did remove claims to submerged lands from Young's scope,
the holding adds very little to the sovereignty of each state. Important
is the overall tenor ofJustice O'Connor's controlling opinion, which,
combined with Justice Souter's dissent, solidifies Young's role as a vital
exception to the Eleventh Amendment. Coeur d'Alene, therefore,
should present little if any hindrance to the continued availability of
federal forums in state-officer suits.
Patrickj Barrett*

220 See Nell Jessup Newton, In the Supreme Court: State of Idaho Seeks a Real Property
Exception to the Ex parte Young Doctrine,WEST'S LEGAL NEws, Oct 16, 1996, availablein
1996 WL 590118.
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 1999; BA. Hamline University, 1992.
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